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School choice and accountability have become popular educational policies in the US 
and the UK. In Europe, such policies are less often applied and therefore less subject 
to research. The present paper uses recent international data to study the impact of 
schools comparing their pupil’s results to a regional or national performance standard 
and  that  of  regional  school  choice  on  student  test  scores.  School  performance 
comparisons and school choice by parents are assumed to complement eachother in 
increasing  both  school  and  teacher  effort.  We  estimate  an  education  production 
function controlling for the hierarchical nature of the data. We also estimate our model 
using  quantiles  of  student  test  scores  to  identify  potentially  different  effects  at 
different levels of student performance. We find that both a higher regional percentage 
of schools comparing their results and regional intensity of school choice significantly 
improve student test scores. This positive effect varies in size according to whether we 
consider low or high-performing students. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
One of the first empirical studies of the factors that influence student's scholastic results 
was the 'Coleman Report' (Coleman et al.1966). The authors found that, in the US, 
allocating more financial resources to schools had no significant impact on student test 
scores.  To  the  contrary,  the  most  important  predictor  of  test  scores  was  the  socio-
economic background of pupils. Since then, international research has not produced 
clear-cut  evidence  on  the  effect  of  additional  funding  on  student  performance 
(Hanushek,  2003).  Moreover,  attention  turned  to  other  factors  that  could  have  a 
significant impact on student test scores. In particular, authors turned to the incentives 
to teacher and student effort that resulted from the institutional settings of educational 
systems (Hanushek, 1997; Woessmann, 2000). This paper fits into the latter category. 
We look at how the practice of schools comparing their pupil’s results to a regional or 
national  performance  standard  and  that  of  parents  choosing  their  children’s  school 
based on reputation or study program relate to student test scores. In the United States 
as  well  as  in  the  United  Kingdom,  school  accountability  and  school  choice  have 
become popular guidelines of educational policy. The idea behind this type of policy is 
that school choice combined with information on school quality will result in school 
competition  sanctioning  the  lowest  performing  schools,  as  in  a  classical  market. 
Abundant recent research in those countries has shown that student performance does 
tend  to  respond  positively  to  school  choice  and  accountability.  However  measured 
effects are small, on average less than ten percent of a standard deviation in scores for a 
one percent increase in competition ( Levacic 2001, Belfield and Levin 2002, Carnoy  
and Loeb 2003). Recent evidence from Sweden is in line with these results (see e.g. 
Sandström and Bergström 2002)   3 
In continental Europe, there is a certain political reluctance to submit public schools to 
competition and accountability. One of the most important reasons could be a strong 
concern  for  equity  of  opportunity.  Indeed,  school  choice  involves  a  risk  of  social 
segregation between schools if information on school quality is poor. If parents do not 
have access to reliable information on school performance that takes into account pupil 
intake,  they will choose schools according to the quality of peer pupils they provide. 
As a result, schools are pushed to compete for better students. This is the ideal setting 
for  segregation,  i.e.  grouping  of  pupils  into  schools  as  a  function  of  observable 
background characteristics. However, the evidence on peer effects for low-performing 
pupils in the literature is mixed (see e.g. Levin 2001, Rangvid 2003) so it is not clear 
how segregation affects performance.  Secondly, education is not a private good and in 
most European states it is largely funded by the public sector.  School comparisons to a 
national or regional standard and school choice will therefore have an effect on school 
quality only if budget allocation by the State takes them into account. Thirdly, low-
performing schools and pupils could suffer from discouragement as they are informed 
of  their  relative  performance,  and  decrease  effort  (e.g.  Betts  and  Grogger  2002).  If 
inter-school  performance-based  competition  increases  the  average  required  level  of 
performance for degree obtention then discouragement might be reinforced. The effects 
on low-performing students of performance-based school competition is not clear-cut. 
Some  studies  find  a  particularly  important  positive  impact  on  low-performing  and 
disfavoured  students  (e.g.  West  and  Peterson  2005),  others  find  a  positive  but  less 
important  impact  on  low-performing  students'  achievement  (e.g.  Hanushek  and 
Raymond 2004). 
 In this paper, we look at the effect of school comparison and school choice in an 
international  setting.  To  this  purpose  we  use  responses  to  the  PISA  2003   4 
questionnaires  in  18  countries.  First  of  all,  we  have  information  as  to  whether 
schools compare their pupil’s results to a regional or national performance standard. 
Secondly, we look at whether parents chose their child’s school on the basis of 
reputation  or  program  rather  than  just  location.  We  then  estimate  an  education 
production function controlling for unobserved differences that could exist between 
countries  and  between  schools.  In  a  second  stage,  we  split  up  the  data  into 
subsamples  of  low  versus  high  performing  students  by  school  to  estimate 
differences in the effect on low versus better-performing pupils. In section 2 we 
explain the choice of our explanatory  variables and present our data. In a third 
section, we present our estimation strategies and section 4 is devoted to the results. 
Our conclusions are given in a final section. 
 
2.   Data and choice of variables 
      2.1.     Our measure of the presence of an external standard and school choice 
In order to estimate the effect of the existence of an external standards of school 
performance on student test scores, we would ideally like to know whether there is 
an external student evaluation at key levels of schooling such as e.g. the French 
Baccalauréat.  However,  such  truly  centralised  exams  are  rare  and  typically 
constitute a country characteristic. This is an important constraint on the number of 
observations. Moreover, educational systems are generally not easily classifiable as 
either having or not such a generalized external evaluation system because of the 
broad variety of exams existing in each country and the broad range of intermediate 
levels of centralisation. Thirdly, we do not have this information in our database. As 
a result, we choose to use available information in the PISA school questionnaire as 
to  whether  schools  compare  their  student’s  test  score  results  to  a  national  or   5 
regional standard or not. If the school claims to do so the dummy ‘school compares 
to a standard’ equals one, zero otherwise. Schools may compare their results with 
national or regional performance levels for different reasons. For instance, schools 
could  use  it  as  a  means  to  check  their  relative  efficiency  on  a  voluntary  basis 
whereas other schools  may  be submitted to  a public  control of performance. In 
either case, the comparison of a school’s results to that of the region or the country 
should  provide  the  type  of  incentive  we  are  looking  for,  as  schools  obtain 
information on their relative performance. 
As a measure of school choice, we use the pupil questionnaire. We therefrom know 
whether  the  pupil  is  in  its  school  because  it  is  known  to  be  of  high  quality 
(reputation) or because of the study program provided. If the pupil responded yes to 
one or  both of these questions we consider there has been quality-based school 
choice (dummy ‘school choice’ equals one, zero otherwise).  
We then aggregate these dummy variables to regional percentages. There are two 
important reasons to do so. Foremost, the percentage of schools comparing their 
results in a given region is used as a proxy for the existence of external student 
performance standards that facilitate performance-based competition. An external 
student  performance  standard  is  defined  as  a  set  of  criteria  for  student  skill 
evaluation that is set by an authority higher than, and independent of the school, 
such as a federal or national ministry of education. To the opposite, internal student 
performance standards are criteria for student skill evaluation set by the teacher or 
the  school.  External  performance  standards  are  thought  to  improve  school  (and 
student) effort for several reasons. First of all by ensuring comparability of school 
performance  for parents and controlling authorities. A school's students' average 
results according to external performance criteria are a signal of school quality. The   6 
information  on  the  relative  performance  of  a  given  school will be all the more 
significant for parents and controlling authorities if many schools compare their 
results.  The  incentive for schools  to improve  their relative performances should 
therefore become stronger when the percentage of comparing schools increases,  as 
the relative position of a school compared to the standard becomes more and more 
revealing. If schools then feel pressure to improve student achievement as a result 
of the school quality  information available to parents and authorities who provide 
their financial means, then school effort can be expected to increase(Bishop et al., 
2000).  A  second  possible  positive  influence  of  school  comparability  on  student 
performance could result from a direct effect on student effort in the last year of 
schooling. Indeed, if employers and universities can use high school test scores as a 
reliable signal of pupil skills, it is likely they will use this information as a criterion 
for hiring. In the long run this should increase the incentive to perform for students, 
as they learn the importance of this signalling (Betts and Costrell 2000, Bishop and 
Mane 2001).  
Our second main explanatory variable, the percentage of parents that chooses their 
child’s school based on reputation or proposed study programs, is a measure of the 
intensity  of  school  choice  in  a  given  region.  The  intensity  of  school  choice  by 
parents can be a result of legislation (that determines whether they may choose at 
all)  but  also  of  geography  (if  there  are  few  local  schools  choice  is  limited)  or 
variance in school quality (if all schools are high quality, residence becomes the 
main  criterion).  The  relevance  of  school  choice  obviously  increases  with  the 
proportion of parents participating and the schools’ incentive to perform should be 
maximal when all parents use quality criterions.   7 
The  second reason why we choose to  use regional  variables is that the dummy 
variables of school comparison to a standard and school choice are subject to a 
potential  endogeneity  problem.  Indeed,  it  could  be  that  only  more  motivated or 
well-performing  schools  choose  to  look  at  their  relative  performance.  To  the 
contrary,  it  could  also  be  the  case  that  for  instance  public  schools  that  are 
considered “at-risk” are more closely monitored on performance by the authorities 
than are more average schools. Also, parents that choose a school on the basis of 
reputation or program might be more educated and/or motivated as they want to 
provide their children with best possible learning environment. We believe that the 
regionally  aggregated  variables  are  not  subject  to  the  type  of  endogeneity  bias 
mentioned  above.  We  assume  that  the  intrinsic  motivation  of  schools  (e.g.  that 
related  to  an  enthusiastic  principal  or  particularly  efficient  cooperation  between 
teachers) is normally distributed in all the regions. If there is larger proportion of 
schools comparing their test scores in a given region, we assume that this is due to 
the institutional setting or regional common practice. The impact of the regional 
preference for or common practice of school comparisons is precisely what we want 
to estimate.  The proportion of parents choosing their children’s school based on 
quality related criteria on the other is likely to be related to the average level of 
education and wealth in the region. We take this into account by including several 
regional characteristics we think could be related to school choice. 
Descriptive statistics of the regional percentage of schools comparing their students' 
results  and  the  regional  percentage  of  parents  choosing  the  school  based  on 
reputation or study program are presented in graph 1 at a national level. We can 
observe that there is important variation in this percentage. The latter is true also at 
the  regional  level  as  can  be  seen  in  graphs  2-19  and  20-39.  Note  that  in  our   8 
estimations  we  use  only  the  regional  percentages.  Coming  back to graph 1, we 
observe that the  national percentages correspond at first sight to what we know of 
national education systems. Belgium, Italy and Brazil for instance show a very low 
level of school comparisons (less than 10% of schools compare to a standard) and a 
very  high  level  of  school  choice  (more  than  60%  of  parents  choose  school  for 
quality of program). These are countries where parents have full school choice but 
there is no central standard for school performance. On the other hand, countries 
like Iceland and Finland have strong national standards for student performance 
(more than 60% of school compare to a standard) but there is very little school 
choice  for  parents  (less  than  20  %).  The  latter  are  strongly  centralised  public 
educational systems. Another group of countries including Germany, Greece, Spain 
and Switzerland, have no centralised performance standard but grant parents only 
limited school choice. These countries often present important regional autonomy to 
decide upon student curricula and allocate pupils to schools by residence. Fourthly, 
countries like the United Kingdom, Australia or Canada give full school choice to 
parents and have centralised curriculum standards to assess school achievement. 
Finally, the rest of the countries in our sample have partial curriculum guidance 
from the State and a variable degree of school choice. These correspond to very 
different institutional settings (many of these countries have heterogeneous regions) 
that yield variable degrees of school comparison to a regional or national standard 
and variable intensity of school choice.  
      2.2.   Database and choice of control  variables 
This paper uses cross-section data from the OECD survey conducted in 2003 
as part of the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA). The PISA 2003 
database contains comparable math, science and reading test scores of a sample of   9 
15 years-old pupils coming from 40 OECD and non-OECD countries. We have 
regional information only for the 18 countries that we use in our analysis. This 
corresponds to 116092 observations after removal of missing data. Pupils are nested 
within schools, potentially attending different grades. All the students in the sample 
took a standard reading, math, and science test, which provided the test scores. The 
scores are comparable across  countries but  not across disciplines. The sampling 
procedure ensures that schools and pupils inside them are randomly selected and 
that  the  sampled  set  of  students  is  representative  of  the  country’s  student 
population. Moreover, for each pupil i trained in school j, the PISA data provides us 
with  a  large  number  of  variables  characterizing  the  student,  its  family  and  the 
school it is attending, from which we selected the variables relevant to our analysis. 
Following a common practice in the literature (Brown, 1991; Vignoles et al., 2000), 
we use the test scores normalized
 to mean 500 and variance 100 as a measure of 
educational output. 
Besides our variable of interest, the percentage of schools comparing their student’s 
test scores to a regional or national average, and the percentage of parents choosing 
the school because it has a good reputation or a special program, Table 1 gives 
summary  statistics  of  our  dependant  and  explanatory  variables.  The  latter  were 
chosen  in  order  to  avoid  correlations,  while  staying  as  close  as  possible  to  the 
conceptual framework sketched in the theoretical literature (e.g., Creemer, 1994; 
Scheerens, 1997; Creemers et al., 2000). A small number of factors are herein put 
forward to explain pupils’ success: (1) their initial aptitudes,  (2) perseverance or 
effort, (3) the opportunities offered to them, and (4) the quality of instruction. First 
of  all,  relying on an extensive  literature (e.g. Ehrenberg, Goldhaber et al  1995; 
McNabb, Sarmistha et al, 2002), we control for gender (the dummy BOY) and age   10 
as observable individual characteristics that may affect initial aptitudes. Secondly, 
in order to include some measure of perseverance and effort, even though it is most 
likely correlated  with parental effort, we added the number of hours each pupil 
spends doing homework each week (HOMEWORK) and information on whether it 
attends a vocational or general type of education (VOCED). We then chose relevant 
measures  and/or  proxies  for  the  two  remaining  groups  of  factors  listed  above, 
starting with the opportunities offered to pupils. These are represented firstly by 
the size of the city the pupil lives in (CITY SIZE). A larger city may e.g. provide 
more  social  services,  a  better  library  or  simply  have  access  to  better  teaching 
materials. Another very important determinant of overall opportunities available is 
the pupil’s family background. This includes information on whether the pupil lives 
with both parents (NON-NUCLEAR FAMILY dummy), the level of education of the 
highest educated parent (PARENT EDUCATION), the highest OECD socio-economic 
index in the household (PARENTS SOCIO-ECO STATUS), and the language, foreign or 
not, spoken at home (FOREIGN LANGUAGE AT HOME). We also included the number 
of books in the house, as estimated by pupil in number of shelves (NUMBER OF 
BOOKS), and the relative availability of learning resources at home (HOME EDUC. 
RESOURCES). Several studies (e.g. Murnane et al, 1981) suggest that the number of 
books at home is a fairly reliable proxy to describe a family’s inclination towards 
learning. Home educational resources is an index based on the availability at home 
of a desk to study at, a quiet place to study, a calculator and a dictionary as well as 
books  useful  for  homework.  For  more  details  on  the  construction  if  this  index 
please refer to OECD (2003). The quality of instruction was captured by several 
school variables. We first introduced the type of funding the school relies on. If the 
school the pupil is attending relies for more than 50% on public funding our dummy   11 
PUBLICSCHOOL  equals one, zero otherwise. We  also include information on the 
school's educational resources (SCHOOL EDUC. MATERIAL) based on the availability 
of  books,  computers,  software,  calculators,  library  materials,  audio-visual  and 
laboratory equipment.  And we include the ratio of computers for student use per 
student.  As  mentioned  before,  however,  many  studies  (Hanushek  1997,  2003; 
Hoxby, 2000) underline that the effect of material resources is not systematic, and 
suggest  that  institutional  factors  and  incentives  structures  may  have  a  stronger 
effect.  Woessmann  (2000),  using  country-level  data  from  PISA,  found  that 
students’  performance  could  stem  primarily  from  institutional  and  school 
organizational characteristics, such as autonomy in school management decisions. 
To explore this possibility, we added four school-level institutional indicators that 
complete our description of the quality of instruction: the degree of centralization 
of the decisions made on teacher hiring and wage increases, the size of the school 
budget, and defining course contents. These are dummy variables equal to one if the 
decision is taken outside the school, zero otherwise.  
The percentage of schools comparing to a national or regional standard and the 
percentage of parents choosing school for quality or program are regional variables. 
It could be that unobserved regional level characteristics are correlated to test scores 
and our main explanatory variables, biasing results. By definition we cannot include 
the  unobserved  regional  variables.  However,  it  is  possible  to  test  that 
percentcompare and percentparentchoice are robust to including a set of observed 
regional variables. The regional variables we include are the regional average socio-
economic  status  of  parents,  regional  average  parent  education  and  the  regional 
unemployment rate to control for the regional economic and social situation. As to 
the regional level of school quality, we control for it by using the regional average   12 
of  school  educational  resources,  its  variance,  and  an  index  of  regional  school 
segregation. The latter is a segregation index measuring the average proportion of 
pupils  of  a  school  that  should  change  schools  in order to  have  a homogeneous 
distribution of minority pupils across the region. If there are e.g. thirty percent of 
foreigners in a region, then the index indicates what proportion of students should 
change schools for each school in the region to have one third foreign pupils. The 
minority considered for segregation here are pupils whose parents have less than 
general secondary schooling.  It is therefore a measure of social segregation. Please 
refer  to  Zoloth  (1976)  for  the  exact  definition  of  the  segregation  index.  The 
segregation index is standardised at mean 0 for ease of interpretation. The variance 
of  the  regional level of school educational  resources  might affect  the  degree of 
school choice. If all schools have a comparable quality level there is no incentive to 
practice school choice. To the contrary, if schools are very different in quality, we 
expect concerned parents to do more effort for choosing an acceptable school. 
3.   Econometric modelling and estimation strategy. 
3.1.     The mixed model 
We  estimate  an  education  production  function.  It  is  defined  as  an  efficient 
technology (Cooper and John, 1997) turning a vector of educational inputs X into a 
vector of output Y: 
Y = f(X)                  (1) 
In Equation  (1) above, X may  include such inputs as a child’s abilities, his/her 
family background and/or educational resources, and where Y may be a set of test 
scores or exam results. In theoretical works, the education production function f 
may appear as a “black box”, with its the functional form left unspecified. Applied   13 
analyses, however, generally rely on a classical regression approach, which assumes 
a linear (or log-linear) shape for f. In this study, we expand the linear regression 
method by taking into account the hierarchical (or clustered) nature of the PISA 
2003  data.  Indeed  students  are  grouped  in  schools  that  function  in  a  particular 
country.  It  is  to  be  expected  that  test  scores  of  students  in  a  same  school  are 
correlated  with  each  other  as  a  result  of  unobserved  school  characteristics.  For 
instance, there could be a nice atmosphere in the school, or stimulating teachers that 
work together in a particularly efficient way, or even a specific grouping of pupils 
or  the  availability  of  a good library that enhance the performance of all  school 
pupils but that we cannot observe. In a similar way, average achievement of schools 
in a same country could be  correlated as schools and pupils are submitted to a 
common political and economic environment that we can again not measure.  Using 
a so-called mixed model allows us to take into account the hierarchically correlated 
structure  of  the  test  score  variance.  We  include  country  dummies  to  capture 
unobserved country effects, and nested school effects that are assumed to be drawn 
from a normal distribution. We do not observe all schools therefore the assumption 
that the unobserved school effects in our dataset are randomly drawn from a normal 
distribution of positive and negative influences is plausible. The unobserved school 
effects are called ‘nested’ because they may be correlated inside a same country.  
The resulting mixed model is written: 
Yijk = bk + Xijk.b + gjk + eijk          (3) 
where,  for  student  i  in  school  j  in  country  k,  Yijk  is  the  test  score  in  a  given 
discipline, Xijk is the vector of explanatory variables, and b its associated vector of 
parameters.  The  X  variables  include  the  individual,  family,  school  and  regional   14 
control variables as well as PERCENTCOMPARE and PERCENTPARENTCHOICE. bk is 
a set of country dummies,  gjk  (the unobserved school effect) is assumed to be 
drawn from a normal distribution and nested within country j) and eijk  the residual 
term.  Similar  models,  also  known  as  multilevel  models  (Yang,  Goldstein  et  al, 
2002), have been used to analyse examination results in a single country (the United 
Kingdom) and a single discipline (Mathematics). The model we applied here is both 
simple  and  convenient,  and  fitted  to  the  analysis  of  several  countries  and 
disciplines. Mixed models are estimated using the Maximum Likelihood technique 
imposing  the  particular  hierarchical  structure  to  the  variance-covariance  matrix. 
Singer (1998) provides a detailed summary of this estimation procedure. 
It  could  be  the  case  that  the  effect  of  PERCENTCOMPARE  and 
PERCENTPARENTCHOICE  varies  across  different  countries.  We  test  whether  the 
coefficients  of  these  variables  are  the  same  for  all  countries  and  whether  each 
country’s coefficients are significantly different from those of the reference country 
Canada. This is done by including crossed effects of these explanatory variables 
with the country dummies. 
Moreover, we expect the impact of schools comparing their performance to a 
regional standard and the practice of parent school choice to depend on a series of 
factors. First of all, we test for a potentially different effect on test scores of 
PERCENTCOMPARE and PERCENTPARENTCHOICE according to whether the school is 
publicly funded. Indeed, we could expect that schools that do not depend on private 
funding are less affected by competition since public funding less often depends on 
school quality. On the other hand, if the state applies sanctions to low-performing 
schools or to the contrary grants them extra support, then publicly funded school   15 
might react to school choice and comparison. We test this hypothesis by including 
crossed effects PUBLICSCHOOL*PERCENTCOMPARE and PUBLICSCHOOL* 
PERCENTPARENTCHOICE.  
Secondly, we expect that more autonomous schools, i.e. schools that have decision-
making power on  teacher  hiring  and wages, school budget and course contents, 
should be more capable of reacting efficiently to a given performance standard and 
competition. For example, schools that can decide which teachers to hire and how 
much to pay them, should be able to choose those teachers that correspond best to 
their  specific  pupils  and  environment.  This  hypothesis  is  tested  using  crossed 
effects  PERCENTCOMPARE   times the four central decision making dummies and 
PERCENTPARENTCHOICE  times  the  four  central  decision  making  dummies.  The 
results of the estimations for the three disciplines (maths, reading and science) are 
given and commented in the next section. 
3.2.  Low versus high-performing pupils 
 
It is well established in the theoretical literature that low versus high-performing 
pupils might  react differently to an external performance standard. It seems that 
high  and  average-performing  pupils  should  be  stimulated  to  more  effort  by  an 
external  standard  as  it  provides  them  with  a  valuable  signal  on  the  labour  and 
academic market. To the contrary, lower performing pupils might be discouraged 
by a standard they feel unable to reach and diminish effort (Betts and Grogger 2002, 
Bishop and Mane 2001). School choice in turn might lead to higher standards or to 
segregation between schools that may have both positive or negative impacts on 
student results, as explained in section 2.1. In order to test whether school choice 
and  school  performance  comparisons  affect  low  versus  high  performing  pupils 
differently in our model, we split up our dataset into subsamples based on quantiles   16 
of  the  test  scores  distribution  by  school.  The  subsamples  correspond  to  pupils 
belonging to different quantiles of the test scores distribution in their school. This 
means that we take the 5% lowest performing pupils from each school to constitute 
our first subsample. The 10% lowest performing pupils from each school constitute 
the second subsample. We then take the pupils that have test scores in the interval 
from  10  to  25%  lowest  test  scores  in  their  school  to  be  in  another  subsample, 
between 25 and 50 percent of lowest test scores, 50 to 75 percent, 75 to 90, 10 
percent highest test scores and 5 percent highest test scores. All these subsamples 
are estimated separately using the mixed model. In order to test whether coefficients 
are  significantly  different  from  one  subsample  to  another  we  create  dummy 
variables for each subsample. If a pupil belongs to subsample 1 then the dummy 
QUANTILE5 equals one, otherwise zero. Following this principle, we create eight 
dummy  variables:  QUANTILE5,  QUANTILE10,  QUANTILE25,  QUANTILE50, 
QUANTILE75,  QUANTILE90,  QUANTILEH10  and  QUANTILEH5.  We  include  these 
dummies  and  these  dummies  crossed  with  the  variables  of  interest 
PERCENTCOMPARE  and  PERCENTPARENTCHOICE  in  the  mixed  model  to  test  for 
differences in the coefficients across subsamples.  
4.     Empirical results 
4.1. Mixed model 
 
Table 2 gives the parameter and standard deviation estimates of the mixed model 
for mathematics, reading and science test scores respectively. Recall from Section 2 
that test scores are standardised at mean 500 and standard deviation 100 for all 
countries. This means we can interpret the coefficients as percentages of standard 
deviation in student test scores. The results of the estimations appear to be quite 
consistent  across  disciplines.  Individual  and  family  characteristics  have  a  very   17 
significant effect on test scores, in line with the literature. The case of gender is 
interesting,  since  it  shows  that  female  students  can  expect  lower  scores  in 
mathematics and science, but higher scores in reading. This result is similar to what 
is  generally  observed  in  the  literature  (e.g.,  Ehrenberg, Goldhaber et al.,  1995). 
Possibly,  innate  differences  in  ways  of  assimilating  maths  and  reading  between 
boys and girls and/or unconscious different expectations from each gender in each 
discipline  by  teachers  may  yield  this  gender  gap.  Parents  education  and  socio-
economic status as well as the family structure, the language spoken at home and 
the  number  of  books  at  home  play  a  very  significant  role  in  predicting  scholar 
achievement.  As  expected,  the  type  of  school  attended  by  pupils  has  a  very 
significant  impact  on  test  scores  in  all  disciplines.  Being  in  a  vocational  track 
decreases scores by around 25 points on average across disciplines.  
Sufficient  availability  of  educational  material  in  a  school  significantly improves 
student performance, more computers available for student use do not. Note that 
school educational material here measures the sufficient availability of a library, 
software and laboratory equipment which are very specific material resources and 
they are measured in terms of need rather than mere quantity. This could explain 
why this material resources variables has a significant effect. The centralisation of  
teacher hiring determination of school budget has a significant negative effect (of 
around 10  points) on student test scores. This result pleads in favour of school 
autonomy  in  making  these  decisions.  Intuitively  we  can  explain  the  negative 
influence of central decision-making by the idea that schools are more efficient in 
making  certain  decisions  as  they  now  their  needs  and  constraints  better  than  a 
central authority. This is not true of teacher wage decisions and course contents, the   18 
degree of centralised decision-making on those topics has no significant impact on 
test scores.  
The percentage of schools comparing to a regional or national standard has a small 
but  significant  positive  effect  on  pupil’s  test  scores  in  all  three  disciplines. 
Coefficients are between 7 (science) and 10 (reading), meaning that each 1 percent 
increase in the number of schools comparing themselves to a standard in the region 
is related to an improvement in student test scores of around 2 points (coefficient 
times 0.27, the standard deviation of PERCENTCOMPARE). The regional percentage 
of  parents  making  school  choice  based  on  reputation  or  program  also  has  a 
significantly positive effect on test scores in all disciplines. Each percent increase in 
parents choosing schools for program or quality is related to an increase in test 
scores of between 3.5 (science) and 5.7 (reading) points. These results are robust to 
including  regional  control  variables  (Table  3).  Noticeably,  the  coefficient  of 
PERCENTCOMPARE increases a little (to an effect of around 2.5 test score points) 
whereas that of PERCENTPARENTCHOICE remains the same. Both coefficients are 
highly significant and of the same sign and magnitude as in the first specification. 
Two of the regional control variables also have a significant effect. One percent 
additional unemployment is correlated with a 7 points decrease in test scores on 
average  and  the  average  regional  level  of  school  educational  resources  also 
positively affects student results. 
Crossed effects of the variables of interest times the country dummies yield a mixed 
impression as to the similarity of the effects across countries (see tables 4 and 5). 
Overall, the coefficients of both coefficients are significantly different from one 
country to another. More of half of the country coefficients for both variables are 
not significantly different from that of the reference country Canada. However, the   19 
percentage of country coefficients that are comparable to that of Canada is larger 
for PERCENTCOMPARE. The lowest percentage of comparable coefficients for the 
latter  variable  is  that  for  science  test  scores  (53%)  ,  but  another  5  country 
coefficients out of 17 (another 30%) are significantly different only at a 10 percent 
confidence level. Differences in country coefficients for PERCENTPARENTCHOICE 
on the other hand concern about half of the countries in the sample. We conclude 
that country differences in the impact of the regional percentage of parent school 
choice are more pronounced than in the impact of regional school comparisons. 
Note that we present only coefficients of the crossed effects but the estimations are 
done using the same specification as before. This is the case for all tables with 
crossed effects. 
Our finding that the percentage of schools comparing their results to a regional or 
national standard and school choice have a small but significant positive impact on 
student performance is in line with results on school accountability from the US and 
the UK mentioned in the introduction. 
4.2. Are more autonomous schools more responsive to school choice and comparisons? 
 
In  a  next  step,  we  would  like  to  test  whether  schools  are  more  responsive  to 
regional school comparisons and school choice if they have more decision-making 
autonomy.  Therefore  we  include  in  our  mixed  model  crossed  effects  of  the 
autonomy  of  decision-making  variables  times  PERCENTCOMPARE  and 
PERCENTPARENTCHOICE.  Centralisation  of  decisions  relate  to  setting  teacher 
wages, hiring teachers, budget and course content. As can be seen in Tables 6 and 7, 
all of these yield no evidence of relevance of such autonomy. None of the crossed 
effects are significantly different from zero. Hence according to our specification,   20 
more decision-making autonomy does not make schools more able to respond to 
school comparison to a regional or national standard or to parent school choice.  
Another point of interest was to determine whether schools that are publicly funded 
benefit less from school comparisons to an national or regional standard and from 
school choice than schools that depend on private funding. As we can see in Table 
8, though our results as to the positive impact of schools comparing to an external 
standard and school choice are preserved, the coefficients of the crossed effect are 
not significantly different from zero. So relying on public funding does not seem to 
modify the effect of school comparison or school choice. 
4.3. Low versus high-performing pupils 
 
The results of the mixed model estimations on different quantiles of student test 
scores  are  presented  in  graphs  40  to  45.  They  represent  the  coefficients  of 
PERCENTCOMPARE and PERCENTPARENTCHOICE for the eight subsamples of pupils 
defined  in  section  3.2.  When  the  quantile’s  coefficients  are  not  significantly 
different from zero (at a 10% level of confidence) the line is dotted instead of full. 
In all disciplines, it appears that there is a decreasing trend in the coefficient of 
PERCENTPARENTCHOICE  (this  can  be  seen  on  graphs  40  to  42).  Whereas  the 
regional percentage of parents choosing schools based on reputation or program has 
a large significant positive impact of around 80*0,16= 12,8 test score points on the 
5% lowest performing pupils’ results, it has a much smaller but significant effect of 
around 4 test score points for the 5% highest performing pupils in all disciplines (on 
average). These coefficients are all significantly different from each other and from 
the 50% quantile sample coefficient as you can see in Table 9. This indicates that it 
are the less than average performing pupils that benefit most from the intensity of 
regional school choice. How should we interpret this result? The data have been   21 
divided into subsamples of pupils by level of performance. This means that e.g. the 
coefficient of percentparentchoice for the lowest performing quantile represents the 
effect  of  the  percentage  of  parents  school  choice  among  the  lowest  performing 
pupils in each school. According to our results, more school choice has a positive 
effect on test scores for all pupils. However, if more low-performing pupils parents 
exert school choice in a region based on quality or program this has a more positive 
impact on their children’s test scores than if more high-performing parents do so.  
From  charts  43  to  45  we  conclude  that  the  regional  percentage  of  schools  that 
compare their results to a national or regional standard has no significant effect on 
the  lowest  nor  the  highest  performing  pupils  (from  the  25  percent  lowest 
performing quantile and the 10 percent highest performing quantile). The largest 
group  of  average  performing  pupils  in  each  school  on  the  other  hand  benefits 
significantly by about 3 test scores points from schools comparing to a standard in 
the region. This is true for all disciplines. Coefficients are not significantly different 
from each other in different quantiles in maths and in science. Only in reading are 
the extreme quantiles significantly different from the coefficient in quantile 25, 50 
and 75 (Table 10). The latter correspond to the average performing group of pupils, 
the only one that benefits from school comparison to a standard.   22 
 5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we  used the PISA 2003  cross  section data to estimate the 
impact  of  the  percentage  of  schools  comparing  their  students  performance  to  a 
regional  or  national  standard  and  that  of  the  regional intensity of parent  school 
choice on student test scores in math, reading and science. In order to take into 
account the hierarchical nature of the data, we used a so-called mixed model that 
allows for correlation of test scores in a same school nested in a same country to 
estimate an “education production function”. Our results echo the findings of the 
existing literature from the United States and the United Kingdom, in the sense that 
school  choice  and  accountability  seem  to  play  a  small  but  significant  role  to 
improve student performance. We find that the percentage of schools comparing 
their students results in a given region significantly increases students test scores by 
about  3%  of  a  standard  deviation  in  all  specifications.  Autonomous  decision-
making as to teacher hiring also significantly increases test scores (by around 4% of 
a standard deviation). We do not find evidence of more autonomous schools or 
privately  funded  schools  reacting  more  efficiently  to  the  percentage  of  regional 
comparisons or school choice. Finally, we do find differences in the impact of the 
percentage of schools comparing their results regionally and school choice along 
the  test  scores  distribution for  all disciplines. Only average performing  students 
seem to gain from an increase in the regional percentage of school comparison. The 
effect  of  the  intensity  of  school  choice  is  decreasing  with  pupil  performance 
meaning that low-performing students benefit most from increased school choice by 
their parents.   23 
References 
Belfield, C.R., & Levin, H.M. (2002). The effect of competition on educational 
outcomes: A review of US evidence. Review of educational resources 72(2), 279-
341. 
 Betts, J.R., & Costrell, R.M. (2000). Incentives and Equity under Standards-Based   
 Reform. Discussion Paper 2000-20 University of San Diego.  
  
 Betts, J.R., & Grogger, J. (2003). The impact of grading standards on student   
 achievement, educational attainment, and entry level earnings. Economics of 
 Education Review  22, 343-352. 
 
 Bishop, J.H., Mane, F., & Bishop, M. (2000). Secondary Education in     
 the United States: What Can Others Learn from Our Mistakes?. unpublished   
 (available on iadb.org). 
Bishop,  J.H.,  &  Mane,  F.  (2001).  The  impacts  of  minimum  competency  exam 
graduation requirements on high school graduation, college attendance and early 
labour market success. Labour Economics 8. 
Brown, B.W. (1991). How gender and socio-economic status affect reading and 
mathematics achievement. Economics of Education Review 10(4), 343-57. 
Carnoy,  M.,  &  Loeb,  S.  (2003).  Does  external  accountability  improve  student 
outcomes? A cross-state analysis. Education Evaluation and Policy Analysis 24(4), 
305-331.  
Coleman, J., Campbell, E.Q., Hobson, C.J., Mc Partland, J., Mood, A.M., Weinfeld, 
F.D., & York, R.L.(1966). Equality of educational opportunity. Washington D.C., 
US Department of Health, Education and welfare, Office of Education (OE 38001). 
Cooper, S.T., & Cohn, E. (1997), Estimation of a frontier production function for 
the South Carolina Educational Process. Economics of Education Review 16(3) : 
313-327. 
Creemer, B.P.M. (1994). The effective classroom. Cassell, London. 
Creemer,  B.P.M.,  Scheerens,  J.,  &  Reynolds  D.  (2000).  Theory development  in 
school effectiveness research. In: Charles Teddlie and David Reynolds (Eds) The 
International Handbook of School Effectiveness Research. Fulmer, 411 p. 
Ehrenberg, R.J., Goldhaber D.D., & Brewer D.J. (1995). Do teachers’ race, gender 
and ethnicity matter ? Evidence from the national educational longitudinal study of 
1988. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 48(3), 547-561. 
Eide,  E.  &  Showalter,  M.  (1998).  The  effect  of  school  quality  on  student 
performance: A quantile regression approach. , 345-350 
Hanushek,  E.A.  (1997).  Assessing  the  effect  of  school  resources  on  student 
performance: an update. Educational evaluation and policy analysis 19(2), 141-64. 
Hanushek,  E.A.  (2003).  The  failure  of  input-based  schooling  policies.  The 
Economic Journal 113(485), F64-F98.   24 
Hanushek, E.A.  ,  & Raymond, M.E. (2004). Does school accountability lead to 
improved student performance?.  NBER Working Paper 10591. 
Hoxby,  C.M.  (2000).  The  effects  of  class  size  on  student  achievement:  new 
evidence  from  population  variation.  Quarterly  Journal of Economics 116, 1239-
1286 
Levacic, R. (2001). An analysis of competition and its impact on secondary school 
examination  performance  in  England.  NCPE  Occasional  Paper  34,  Teachers 
College. 
Levin, J. (2001). For whom the reductions count: A quantile regression analysis of 
class size and peer effects on scholastic achievement. Empirical Economics Vol. 26 
(1): 221-246. 
McNabb, R., Sarmistha, P., & Sloane, P. (2002). Gender differences in educational 
attainment:  the  case  of  university  students  in  England  and  Wales.  Economica 
69(275), 481-503. 
 Murnane, R.J., Maynard, R.A., & Ohls, J.C. (1981). Home resources and children’s                           
achievement. The Review of Economics and Statistics 63(3), 369-377. 
OECD (2004), Manual for the PISA 2003 database. 
Rangvid, B. S. (2003). Educational peer effects: quantile regression evidence from 
Denmark  with  PISA  2000  data.  Unpublished.  The  Aarhus  Schools  of  Business, 
Copenhagen, Denmark. 
Sandström, M., & Bergström, F. (2002). School vouchers in practice: competition 
won’t  hurt  you!.  Working  Paper  Nr  578,  The  Research  Institute  of  Industrial 
Economics.  
Scheerens,  J.  (1997).  Conceptual  models  and  theory-embedded  principles  on 
effective schools. School effectiveness and school improvement 8(3), 269-310. 
Singer,  J.D.  (1998).  Using  SAS  PROC  MIXED  to  fit  multilevel  models, 
hierarchical  models,  and  individual  growth  models.  Journal  of  Educational  and 
Behavioral Statistics 24(4), 323-355. 
Vignoles,  A.,  Levacic,  R.,  Walker  J.,  Machin  S.,  &  Reynolds  D.  (2000).  The 
relationship between resource allocation and pupil attainment: a review.  Published 
by the Centre for the Economics of Education, London, 86 p. 
West, M.R., & Peterson, P.E. (2005). The efficacy of choice threats within school 
accountability  systems:  results  from  legislatively  induced  experiments.  PEPG 
Harvard 2005. 
Woessmann, L. (2000). Schooling resources, educational institutions, and student 
performance: the international evidence. Kiel Working Paper n°983 (December). 
Kiel Institute of World Economics, Kiel. 
Yang,  M.,  Goldstein,  H.,  Browne,  W.,  &  Woodhouse,  G.  (2002).  Multivariate 
Multilevel  Analyses  of  Examination  Results.  Journal  of  the  Royal  Statistical 
Society Series A (Statistics in Society) 165(1), 137-53.   25 
















   26 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Dependant variables     
     
Score in maths  500  100 
Score in reading 





     
Explanatory variables     
     
Initial aptitudes     
Boy  0.49  0.50 
Age  15.81  0.29 
     
Effort     
Homework (hours per week)  5.42  5.44 
Vocational education  0.17  0.38 
     
Opportunities     
City size  2.99  1.13 
Number of books at home  3.30  1.45 
Non-nuclear family  0.28  0.45 
Foreign lang. At home  0.03  0.18 
Parents education  4.10  1.70 
Parents socio-eco status  48.06  17.23 
Home Educ. Resources  0.00  1.00 
     
Quality of instruction     
School Educ Material  0.00  1.00 
Ratio computers/student  0.09  0.10 
Central course content  0.40  0.49 
Central teacher hiring  0.37  0.48 
Central budget  0.29  0.45 
Central teacher wage  0.78  0.42 
Publicly funded school  0.87  0.34 
     
Regional variables     
Percentcompare region  0.49  0.26 
Percentparentchoice region  0.48  0.16 
Unemployment rate region  0.03  0.02 
School Segregation region  0.00  1.00 
Average socio-eco status region  48.06  4.88 
Average parent education region  4.12  0.78 
Average school material region  0.00  0.50 
Variance school material region  0.84  0.19 
Number of Obs.  116092   
   27 
Table 2 : Mixed model, dependant variable: test scores 
  MATH  READ  SCIENCE 
  Coeff.    StdErr Coeff.    StdErr Coeff.    StdErr 
Intercept  274.82 *** 13.01  283.09 *** 13.81  200.59 *** 13.98 
Initial aptitudes                
Boy  18.46 ***  0.43  -24.92 ***  0.46  13.83 ***  0.47 
Age  9.51 ***  0.75  9.87 ***  0.80  13.51 ***  0.82 
 
Effort 
Homework  1.49 ***  0.04  1.80 ***  0.04  1.71 ***  0.05 
Vocational track  -26.46 ***  1.44  -23.66 ***  1.48  -24.75 ***  1.47 
                
Opportunities                
City size  4.39 ***  0.56  5.03 ***  0.55  3.68 ***  0.54 
Number of books  9.67 ***  0.18  8.33 ***  0.19  10.24 ***  0.20 
Non-nuclear family  -7.58 ***  0.47  -6.36 ***  0.50  -6.78 ***  0.51 
Foreign lang. at home  -20.23 ***  1.19  -32.88 ***  1.29  -33.47 ***  1.31 
Parent education  0.25   0.16  0.63 ***  0.17  1.05 ***  0.17 
Parent socio-eco status  0.53 ***  0.01  0.56 ***  0.02  0.56 ***  0.02 
Home Educ. Resources  7.27 ***  0.24  8.43 ***  0.25  7.40 ***  0.26 
 
Quality of instruction 
School Educ. Material  5.75 ***  0.67  5.62 ***  0.65  5.38 ***  0.64 
Ratio computer/student  8.63   7.78  9.11   7.61  -0.52   7.44 
Central course content  1.40   1.42  2.08   1.39  2.16   1.36 
Central teacher hiring  -10.77 ***  1.77  -11.47 ***  1.73  -9.85 ***  1.69 
Central school budget  -3.60 **  1.55  -3.89 **  1.52  -4.52 ***  1.48 
Central teacher wage  4.36 **  1.73  3.16 *  1.69  1.79   1.65 
Publicly funded school  -3.57 *  2.03  -2.82   1.98  -4.03 **  1.94 
 
Regional variables 
Percent compare  8.41 **  3.76  9.93 ***  3.68  7.09 **  3.59 
Percentparentchoice  31.69 ***  9.58  35.79 ***  9.35  21.87 **  9.14 
Number of obs  116092 
*,**,***  respectively  stand  for  significance  at  the  10,  5  and  1%  levels  of  confidence.  28 
Table 3: mixed model with regional control variables, dependant variable: test 
scores 
  MATH  READ  SCIENCE 
  Coeff.    StdErr  Coeff.    StdErr Coeff.    StdErr 
Intercept  297.85 ***  19.55  303.74 ***  19.85  230.88 ***  19.79 
Initial aptitudes 
Boy  18.46 ***  0.43  -24.92 ***  0.46  13.83 ***  0.47 
Age  9.55 ***  0.75  9.91 ***  0.80  13.53 ***  0.82 
 
Effort 
Homework  1.49 ***  0.04  1.80 ***  0.04  1.71 ***  0.05 
Vocational track  -26.97 ***  1.44  -24.26 ***  1.47  -25.16 ***  1.47 
 
Opportunities 
Number of books  9.68 ***  0.18  8.35 ***  0.19  10.25 ***  0.20 
City Size  4.11 ***  0.58  4.75 ***  0.56  3.54 ***  0.55 
Non-nuclear family  -7.57 ***  0.47  -6.35 ***  0.50  -6.77 ***  0.51 
Foreign lang. at home  -20.22 ***  1.19  -32.87 ***  1.29  -33.45 ***  1.31 
Parents education  0.25   0.16  0.62 ***  0.17  1.05 ***  0.17 
Parents socio-eco status  0.53 ***  0.01  0.56 ***  0.02  0.56 ***  0.02 
Home Educ. Resources  7.24 ***  0.24  8.39 ***  0.25  7.37 ***  0.26 
 
Quality of instruction 
School Educ. Material  4.63 ***  0.68  4.57 ***  0.67  4.69 ***  0.65 
Ratio computers/student  2.34   7.73  3.37   7.57  -5.23   7.43 
Central course content  1.69   1.41  2.38 *  1.38  2.33 *  1.35 
Central teacher hiring  -9.59 ***  1.75  -10.50 ***  1.71  -9.03 ***  1.68 
Central school budget  -3.22 **  1.54  -3.43 **  1.51  -4.04 ***  1.48 
Central teacher wage  3.71 **  1.71  2.41   1.67  1.45   1.64 
Publicly funded school  -3.90 *  2.01  -3.09   1.96  -4.20 **  1.92 
 
Regional variables 
Average socio-eco status region  -0.81 *  0.45  -0.96 **  0.44  -0.34   0.44 
Average parents education region  5.45   4.02  6.61 *  3.93  -1.76   3.86 
Average school material region  11.65 ***  2.52  11.00 ***  2.46  6.98 ***  2.41 
Variance school material region  1.82   4.27  7.04 *  4.17  3.56   4.09 
Regional school segregation  0.38   1.01  0.92   0.98  0.78   0.96 
Unemployment rate region  -383.70 ***  42.52  -355.21 ***  41.55  -306.61 ***  40.81 
Percentcompare  10.24 ***  3.79  11.31 ***  3.70  8.56 **  3.64 
Percentparentchoice  33.84 ***  10.34  34.93 ***  10.10  22.77 **  9.91 
Number of Obs.  116092 
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Table 4: Coefficients of percentcompare by country: do they differ from the coefficient for 
reference  country  Canada?  Mixed  model  with  same  specification  as  table  2  plus  crossed 
effects. Dependant variable: test scores 
 
 
  MATH  READ  SCIENCE 
  F Value      F Value      F Value     
Test: slopes are equal  6.94  <.0001 Different  5.43  <.0001 Different  6  <.0001 Different 
Australia  5.11  0.024  Different  2.55  0.110  Equal  3.45  0.063  Different 
Belgium  84.7  <.0001 Different  69.48  <.0001 Different  59.98  <.0001 Different 
Brazil  5.57  0.018  Different  1.22  0.270  Equal  3.14  0.076  Different 
Czech Republic  3.07  0.080  Different  2.54  0.111  Equal  2.91  0.088  Different 
Finland  0.16  0.685  Equal  0.2  0.658  Equal  0.01  0.929  Equal 
Germany  0.03  0.855  Equal  0.19  0.663  Equal  0.13  0.722  Equal 
Greece  2.66  0.103  Equal  0.67  0.415  Equal  0.07  0.792  Equal 
Iceland  0.55  0.456  Equal  1.78  0.183  Equal  2.95  0.086  Different 
Italy  0.01  0.920  Equal  1.31  0.253  Equal  3.26  0.071  Different 
Mexico  0.18  0.672  Equal  2.03  0.155  Equal  1.16  0.282  Equal 
Portugal  1.93  0.165  Equal  0.56  0.455  Equal  2.23  0.135  Equal 
Slovakia  0.39  0.532  Equal  0.95  0.330  Equal  0.79  0.373  Equal 
Spain  0.67  0.414  Equal  0  0.960  Equal  12.93  0.000  Different 
Switzerland  2.69  0.101  Equal  2.38  0.123  Equal  0.82  0.366  Equal 
Tunisia  1.47  0.225  Equal  0.53  0.467  Equal  2.2  0.138  Equal 
Turkey  7.46  0.006  Different  3.68  0.055  Different  4.34  0.037  Different 
United Kingdom  0.33  0.565  Equal  0.04  0.837  Equal  0.1  0.751  Equal 
Percentage equal   0.71      0.88      0.53     
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Table 5: Coefficients of percentparentchoice by country: do they differ from the coefficient for 
reference country Canada? Mixed model with same specification as in table 2 plus crossed  
effects. Dependant variable: test scores 
 
 
  MATH  READ  SCIENCE 
  F Value  Pr > F    F Value  Pr > F    F Value  Pr > F   
Test slopes are equal  5.13  <.0001 Different  5.86  <.0001 Different  4.26  <.0001 Different 
Australia  4.9  0.027  Different  5.14  0.023  Different  6.44  0.011  Different 
Belgium  23.71  <.0001 Different  17.27  <.0001 Different  20.43  <.0001 Different 
Brazil  17.53  <.0001 Different  24.86  <.0001 Different  13.78  0.000  Different 
Czech Republic  0.92  0.337  Equal  0.75  0.387  Equal  1.21  0.272  Equal 
Finland  2.7  0.100  Equal  4.05  0.044  Different  4.37  0.037  Different 
Germany  0.72  0.398  Equal  0.36  0.550  Equal  0.42  0.519  Equal 
Greece  0.04  0.837  Equal  1.32  0.251  Equal  2.22  0.136  Equal 
Iceland   0.99  0.319  Equal  2.75  0.097  Different  3.97  0.046  Different 
Italy  11.08  0.001  Different  20.66  <.0001 Different  0.05  0.820  Equal 
Mexico  0.09  0.768  Equal  0.14  0.704  Equal  0.4  0.529  Equal 
Portugal  0.48  0.487  Equal  0.33  0.565  Equal  0.66  0.415  Equal 
Slovakia  0.17  0.682  Equal  0.16  0.690  Equal  0.22  0.639  Equal 
Spain  0.26  0.609  Equal  3.38  0.066  Different  9.7  0.002  Different 
Switzerland  4.57  0.033  Different  5.5  0.019  Different  7.95  0.005  Different 
Tunisia  0.15  0.699  Equal  0.34  0.558  Equal  0.19  0.659  Equal 
Turkey  1.63  0.202  Equal  0.73  0.393  Equal  1.72  0.190  Equal 
United Kingdom  11.98  0.001  Different  6.82  0.009  Different  0.1  0.750  Equal 
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Table 6: Mixed model (as in table 2) with crossed effects centralised decision-making times 
percentparentchoice. Dependant variable: test scores 
  MATH  READ  SCIENCE 
Effect  Estimate   StdErr Estimate   StdErr  Estimate    
Intercept  179.32 ***  13.37  191.04 ***  14.16  114.69 *** 14.39 
Percentcompare  10.47 ***  3.41  12.22 ***  3.34  9.18 ***  3.34 
Percentparentchoice  3.64   12.25  11.85   12.03  -0.49   12.01 
Central course content  -4.80   3.81  -1.27   3.74  -1.79   3.74 
Central teacher hiring  -6.93   4.55  -12.87 ***  4.46  -8.42 *  4.45 
Central school budget  -9.67 **  3.89  -7.76 **  3.82  -7.81 **  3.82 
Central teacher wage  -0.24   5.32  0.57   5.23  -1.67   5.22 
Percentparentchoice*central course content  13.76 *  7.53  7.59   7.38  8.93   7.37 
Percentparentchoice*central teacher wage  8.15   10.34  3.99   10.17  5.96   10.15 
Percentparentchoice*central teacher hiring  -1.70   9.25  9.46   9.06  2.90   9.04 
Percentparentchoice*central school budget  11.92   7.76  7.30   7.61  6.09   7.60 





Table 7: Mixed model (as in table 2) with crossed effects centralised decision-making times 
percentcompare. Dependant variable: test scores 
                  MATH  READ  SCIENCE 
Effect  Estimate    StdErr  Estimate    StdErr  Estimate    StdErr 
Central course content  -0.01    2.55  0.50    2.50  0.06    2.50 
Central teacher hiring  -8.61 ***  3.20  -10.34 ***  3.14  -8.69 ***  3.14 
Central school budget  -4.65    2.98  -1.89    2.92  -2.63    2.91 
Central teacher wage  -5.10    3.95  -2.79    3.88  0.47    3.87 
Percentcompare  -4.00    5.90  3.11    5.79  5.91    5.78 
Percentparentchoice  21.76 **  8.69  25.72 ***  8.52  12.14    8.50 
Percentcompare*central course content  4.00    4.80  4.09    4.71  5.15    4.70 
Percentcompare*central teacher wage  15.09 **  6.32  9.61    6.20  1.69    6.19 
Percentcompare*central teacher hiring  2.23    5.79  3.77    5.67  3.20    5.66 
Percentcompare*central school budget  0.86    5.28  -5.00    5.17  -4.47    5.16 
*,**,*** respectively stand for significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels of confidence   32 
Table 8: Mixed model (as in table 2) with crossed effects publicschool times percentcompare 
and percentparentchoice. Dependant variable: test scores 
  *,**,*** respectively stand for significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels of confidence.  
 
 
Table 9: test differences in coefficients of percentparentchoice between quantiles. Dependant 
variable: test scores 
 
Label  F Value  Pr > F    F Value  Pr > F    F Value  Pr > F   
Test all coefficients  
are equal  268.1  <.0001 
 
Different  158.22  <.0001 
 
Different  236.4  <.0001 
 
Different
Test q10=q50  246.26  <.0001 Different  203.24  <.0001 Different  119.94  <.0001 Different
Test q25=q50  97.97  <.0001 Different   73.88  <.0001 Different  67.04  <.0001 Different
Test q75=q50  94.51  <.0001 Different  50.34  <.0001 Different  116.22  <.0001 Different
Test q90=q50  231.46  <.0001 Different  105.65  <.0001 Different  299.57  <.0001 Different




Table  10:  Test  differences  in  coefficients of  percentcompare  between quantiles. Dependant 
variable: test scores 
 
  MATHS  READ  SCIENCE 
Label  F Value  Pr > F    F Value  Pr > F    F Value  Pr > F   
Test all coefficients  
are equal  1.42  0.212 
 
 Equal  10.48  <.0001 
 
 Different  1.71  0.128  Equal 
Test q10=q50  0.70  0.402  Equal  17.38  <.0001  Different  2.29  0.130  Equal 
Test q25=q50  0.02  0.887  Equal  2.66  0.103  Equal  2.07  0.150  Equal 
Test q75=q50  0.91  0.340  Equal  0.19  0.660  Equal  0.47  0.493  Equal 
Test q90=q50  1.00  0.318  Equal  3.60  0.058  Different  0.20  0.652  Equal 
Test q95=q50  4.09  0.043  Equal  13.43  0.000  Different  0.70  0.401  Equal 
  MATH  READ  SCIENCE 
Effect  Estimate   StdErr  Estimate   StdErr  Estimate   StdErr 
Intercept  157.64 ***  14.78  175.09 ***  15.45  97.78 ***  15.65 
Publicschool  7.15   9.05  3.96   8.89  4.42   8.88 
Percentcompare  13.55 *  7.54  22.34 ***  7.39  17.07 **  7.37 
Percentparentchoice  39.86 ***  15.07  30.83 **  14.79  22.19   14.76 
Percentparentchoice*publicschool  -20.93   14.18  -11.43   7.50  -8.78   7.49 
Percentcompare*publicschool  -3.13   7.66  -5.32   13.93  -10.78   13.90   0































Graphs 2-13 :  Percentage  of schools  comparing their pupils results’ to  a national or regional 



















































































































































































































































































































































Graphs 14-19 : Percentage of schools comparing their results to a national or regional standard, 









































































































































































                       Graphs 20-32 : Percentage of parents choosing their children’s school based on reputation or  
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Graphs 33-39 : Percentage of parents choosing their children’s school based on reputation or 
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 Graphs 40-42 : By quantile of pupils test scores, variable percentparentchoice. 
 Dependant variables: pupils’ test scores in respective disciplines. 
 
Coefficients of Percentparentchoice by quantile,





















Coefficients of PERCENTPARENTCHOICE by quantile, 



















Coefficients of PERCENTPARENTCHOICE by quantile, 
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Graphs 43-45 : By quantile of pupils test scores variable percentcompare. 
 Dependant variables: pupils test scores in respective disciplines. 
 
Coefficient of PERCENTCOMPARE by quantile, 



















Coefficient of PERCENTCOMPARE by quantile, 

















Coefficient of PERCENTCOMPARE by quantile,
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